reply U.S. manufacturing repatriation ineffective

The U.S. Institute for Supply Management (ISM) data released on July 3 showed that the manufacturing purchasing managers' index (PMI) fell to 46 in June, the lowest level since May 2020, and eight consecutive months below the Rongkou line of 50, the longest contraction cycle since 2009.Weakness in the U.S. manufacturing sector has persisted for several years, with the number and share of manufacturing employment declining. Since 1939, U.S. manufacturing employment has continued to grow, peaking in 1978 (19.33 million). 2022, U.S. manufacturing employment of 12.98 million. Although up from the historic low level in 2020, it is still at a low level. And, in 2022, the share of U.S. manufacturing employment in all employment is only 8%, at an all-time low. In terms of the proportion of total electricity consumption, the share of electricity consumption in the industrial sector in 2022 is 25.8%, which is even lower than the 26.5% in 2013 before the intensive introduction of the manufacturing repatriation policy, and much lower than the share of electricity consumption in the industrial sector in major emerging economies. 2023, at the beginning of the year, not only industrial electricity consumption in the U.S. is declining year-on-year, but also total electricity consumption, which indicates that the U.S. manufacturing repatriation is far from This indicates that the return of manufacturing to the U.S. is far from reaching the expected effect.In addition, the Bank of China International Research Institute's recently released "Bank of China Global Economic and Financial Outlook Report (Third Quarter 2023)" (the "Report") believes that, in general, the effectiveness of the U.S. manufacturing repatriation is still limited. 2009-2021, the U.S. manufacturing value added as a share of GDP and the manufacturing self-sufficiency rate are both declining, and although there is a new change in 2022, both of them only increase by by 0.3 percentage points. And, a significant portion of this improvement comes from the recovery of production activity and supply chains after the epidemic. The return of manufacturing to employment and imports has not been evident either, as ADP manufacturing employment as a share of nonfarm payrolls has continued its decline since 2022, falling 0.2 percentage points in May 2023 compared to the beginning of 2022, and manufacturing employment has not yet returned to pre-epidemic levels. Currently, U.S. merchandise imports are around $2.6 trillion or less, significantly higher than the level of around $2.1 trillion in 2018 versus 2019.The Report also argues that there is uncertainty about the prospects for the return of U.S. manufacturing. On the one hand, the high cost of investment is an important challenge for companies to return to the United States. In the chip industry, for example, the cost of building a semiconductor chip factory in the United States is more than 40% higher than in Taiwan, China, and from the implementation details of the Chip and Science Act announced this year, the amount of subsidies can only cover 5% to 15% of the cost of setting up a factory, and the production and operation activities of enterprises applying for subsidies will be subject to greater restrictions by the U.S. TSMC and Samsung are building factories in the United States have significantly increased the estimated plant construction Costs. At the same time, expensive labor costs and production efficiency are the problems faced by enterprises. On the other hand, the United States to attract manufacturing back to face competition from other countries. The EU is stepping up the pace of a series of chip revitalization plans. April 2022, involving investments of up to 43 billion euros, the final version of the European Chip Act, the bill has attracted Intel, Global Crystal, Infineon, STMicroelectronics, etc. to carry out new projects in Europe. June 2023, the EU announced the "European common interest important plan ", and approved 21.7 billion euros in funding to continue to support the development of the chip industry. The two major economies of the United States and Europe in the chip industry competition intensified.After the global financial crisis in 2008, the United States began to attach great importance to the ills of excessive virtualization of the economy, after the successive governments have been from the policy end to boost the local manufacturing industry. The Obama administration's strategy of "reinvigorating American manufacturing" focuses on increasing government investment, encouraging exports and focusing on advanced manufacturing; the Trump administration's policy orientation is to grasp both new industries and traditional industries such as steel and aluminum products, and encourage manufacturing industries to return by providing tax incentives internally and imposing tariff barriers externally. A distinctive feature of the Biden administration is its emphasis on deepening alliance partnerships to strengthen the autonomy of key supply chains.The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 and the Chip and Science Act have provided significant incentives for high-tech companies to expand their investments in the United States. The two bills use tax credits, financial subsidies and other measures to attract high-tech companies such as semiconductors, automobiles and batteries to build factories in the United States. In terms of the structure of new jobs, the number of jobs created in 2022 in the high-tech and medium-high technology sectors accounted for 64% and 23%, respectively, significantly higher than the medium-low (7%) and low-tech sectors (5%). In terms of industry value added, compared to low value-added industries such as textile and garment, food and beverage, machinery